The Insurgent Archipelago

This volume explores new perspectives on contemporary forms of violence in South Asia. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and case studies, it examines the infiltration of violence at the societal level and affords a comparative regional analysis of its historical, cultural and geopolitical origins in South Asia. Featuring essays from Sri Lanka to Nepal, and from Afghanistan to Burma, it sheds light on issues as wide-ranging as lynching and mob justice, hate speech, caste violence, gender-based violence and the plight of the Rohingyas, among others. Lucid and engaging, this book will be an invaluable source of reference as well as scholarship to students and researchers of postcolonial studies, anthropology, sociology, cultural geography, minority studies, politics and gender studies.

At a time when even the foundations and pre-eminence of the Western order are called into question by both the weaknesses of the transatlantic partnership and the spectacular rise of the Asia-Pacific region, suggesting a switch to a post-Atlantic order, the contributors to this volume provide specific answers to present-day interrogations pertaining to various processes of transformation. This book offers multidisciplinary perspectives on political, economic, social, technological and cultural dimensions of change, and proposes various possible responses to current global and regional challenges.

This book analyses the nationalist rebellion which emerged in Romania following the Second World War. The first two decades after the end of the war were times of rebellion in imperial peripheries. Armed movements, sometimes communist but nearly always nationalist in orientation, rose in opposition to retreating or advancing imperial powers. One such armed revolt took place in Romania, pitting nationalist partisans against a communist government. This book is an analysis of how the authorities crushed this rebellion, set in the context of parallel campaigns fought in Europe and the Third World. It focuses on population control through censorship, propaganda and deportations. It analyses military operations, particularly patrols, checkpoints, ambushes and informed strikes. Intelligence operations are also discussed, with an emphasis on recruiting informants, on interrogation, torture and infiltration. Bullets, brains and barbwire, not "hearts and minds" approaches, crushed internal rebels in post-1945 campaigns.

As a young British officer in the Gurkha regiment, John Mackinlay served in the rainforests of North Borneo and experienced firsthand the Maoist-style insurgencies of the 1960s. Years later, as a United Nations researcher, he witnessed the chaotic deployment of international forces to Africa, the Balkans, and South Asia, and the transformation of territorial, labor-intensive uprisings into the international insurgent networks we know today. After 9/11, Mackinlay turned his eye toward the Muslim communities of Europe and institutional efforts to prevent terrorism. In particular, he investigates military expeditions to Iraq and Afghanistan and their effect on the social cohesion of European populations that

include Muslims from these regions. In a world divided between rich and poor, the surest way for the "bottom billion" to gain recognition, express outrage, or improve their circumstances is through insurgency. In this book, Mackinlay explains why leaders from the wealthiest and most powerful nations have failed to understand this phenomenon. Our current bin Laden era, Mckinlay argues, must be viewed as one stage in a series of developments swept up in the momentum of a global insurgency. The campaigns of the 1960s are directly linked to the global movements of tomorrow, yet in the past two decades, insurgent activity has given rise to a new practice that incorporates and exploits the "propaganda of the deed." This shift challenges our vertically-structured response to terror and places a greater emphasis on mastering the virtual, cyber-based dimensions of these campaigns. Mckinlay revisits the roots of global insurgencies, describes their nature and character, reveals the power of mass communications and grievance, and recommends how individual nations can counter these threats by focusing on domestic terrorism.

Waging War: Conflict, Culture, and Innovation in World History provides a wide-ranging examination of war in human history, from the beginning of the species until the current rise of the so-called Islamic State. Although it covers many societies throughout time, the book does not attempt to tell all stories from all places, nor does it try to narrate "important" conflicts. Instead, author Wayne E. Lee describes the emergence of military innovations and systems, examining how they were created and then how they moved or affected other societies. These innovations are central to most historical narratives, including the development of social complexity, the rise of the state, the role of the steppe horseman, the spread of gunpowder, the rise of the west, the bureaucratization of military institutions, the industrial revolution and the rise of firepower, strategic bombing and nuclear weapons, and the creation of "people's war."

'Who is the enemy?' This is the question most asked in modern warfare; gone are the set-piece conventional battles of the past. Once seen as secondary to more traditional conflicts, irregular warfare (as modified and refashioned since the 1990s) now presents a major challenge to the state and the bureaucratic institutions which have dominated the twentieth century, and to the politicians and civil servants who formulate policy.Twenty-first-century conflict is dominated by counterinsurgency operations, where the enemy is almost indistinguishable from innocent civilians. Battles are gunfights in jungles, deserts and streets; winning 'hearts and minds' is as important as holding territory. From struggles in South Africa, the Philippines and Ireland to operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya, this book covers the strategy and doctrine of counterinsurgency, and the factors which ensure whether such operations are successful or not. Recent ignorance of central principles and the emergence of social media, which has shifted the odds in favour of the insurgent, have too often resulted in failure, leaving governments and their security forces embedded in a hostile population, immersed in costly and dangerous nation-building.

In The Security Archipelago, Paul Amar provides an alternative historical and theoretical framing of the refashioning of free-market states and the rise of humanitarian security regimes in the Global South by examining the pivotal, trendsetting cases of Brazil and Egypt. Addressing gaps in the study of neoliberalism and biopolitics, Amar describes how coercive security operations and cultural rescue campaigns confronting waves of resistance have appropriated progressive, antimarket discourses around morality, sexuality, and labor. The products of these struggles—including powerful new police practices, religious politics, sexuality identifications, and gender normativities—have traveled across an archipelago, a metaphorical island chain of what the global security industry calls "hot spots." Homing in on Cairo and Rio de Janeiro, Amar reveals the innovative resistances and unexpected alliances that have coalesced in new polities emerging from the Arab Spring and South America's Pink Tide. These have generated a shared modern governance model that he terms the "human-security state."

This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency, the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation Iraqi Freedom to examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex counterinsurgency environments. Through this analysis, four factors emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the counterinsurgency effort's requirement for indirect fires, constraints and limitations on indirect fires, the counterinsurgency effort's force organization, and the conversion cost of non-standard roles for artillery units. In conclusion, the study offers five broadly descriptive fundamentals for employing artillery units in a counterinsurgency environment: invest in tactical leadership, exploit lessons learned, support the operational approach and strategic framework, maintain a pragmatic fire support capability, and minimize collateral damage. Finally, the study examines the role of education for leaders in a counterinsurgency, and it's influence on these imperative fundamentals.

The purpose of this research was to obtain a historically rooted understanding of the development, application, and adaptation of the British COIN approach—one from which the US has borrowed heavily. It focuses upon those factors which interfere with timely, adaptive application of current COIN doctrine as soon as the warning signs of insurgency present themselves. The price of failing to do so in terms of blood and treasure has been widely proclaimed daily in the news media during the past decade of American and British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Authors on both sides of the Atlantic have already made much of the US Army's failure to capture COIN lessons from Vietnam and its abandonment of COIN education in its schools after the 1970s. For this reason, most American commanders went into Iraq with no doctrinal guide for COIN, a deficiency corrected only after painful reflection on the characteristics of the environment and the inefficacy of the conventional methods they initially employed. The British Army, on the other hand, went into Iraq with a COIN doctrine revised five times since the completion of its successful operations in

Malaya, 1948-1960, including a version published only two years prior to entry into Iraq. Why did the British Army struggle with identifying insurgency and application of its own corresponding doctrine?

This volume provides an authoritative, cutting-edge resource on the characteristics of both technological and social change in warfare in the twenty-first century, and the challenges such change presents to international law. The character of contemporary warfare has recently undergone significant transformation in several important respects: the nature of the actors, the changing technological capabilities available to them, and the sites and spaces in which war is fought. These changes have augmented the phenomenon of non-obvious warfare, making understanding warfare one of the key challenges. Such developments have been accompanied by significant flux and uncertainty in the international legal sphere. This handbook brings together a unique blend of expertise, combining scholars and practitioners in science and technology, international law, strategy and policy, in order properly to understand and identify the chief characteristics and features of a range of innovative developments, means and processes in the context of obvious and non-obvious warfare. The handbook has six thematic sections: Law, war and technology Cyber warfare Autonomy, robotics and drones Synthetic biology New frontiers International perspectives. This interdisciplinary blend and the novel, rich and insightful contribution that it makes across various fields will make this volume a crucial research tool and guide for practitioners, scholars and students of war studies, security studies, technology and design, ethics, international relations and international law.

Far from being an anachronism, much less a kit-bag of techniques, people's war raises what has always been present in military history, irregular warfare, and fuses it symbiotically with what has likewise always been present politically, rebellion and the effort to seize power. The result is a strategic approach for waging revolutionary warfare, the effort "to make a revolution." Voluntarism is wedded to the exploitation of structural contradiction through the building of a new world to challenge the existing world, through formation of a counterstate within the state in order ultimately to destroy and supplant the latter. This is a process of far greater moment than implied by the label "guerrilla warfare" so often applied to what Mao and others were about. This volume deals with the continuing importance of Maoist and post-Maoist concepts of people's war. Drawing on a range of examples that include Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan, the collection shows that the study of people's war is not just an historical curiosity but vital to the understanding of contemporary insurgent and terrorist movements. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Small Wars & Insurgencies.

Boko Haram is the major threat to the Nigerian state, and has emerged as a destabilizing factor across sub-Saharan Africa. This is now a major focus of global policy-making, as between 2013 and 2014 insurgency-related deaths in

Nigeria exceeded those in Iraq and Afghanistan. This book is the first to focus on the military nature of Boko Haram, the reasons for its success in those specific regions of the Chad basin it operates in and a detailed history of the Nigerian army's counter-insurgency – with whom, uniquely, the author has spent research time. The book identifies and analyses the battles and skirmishes on the front line, as well as unearthing a wider explanation for Boko Haram's military success and the causes of the instability in the region.

"This monograph is based on interviews with David Galula's surviving family and friends as well as archival research. It places Galula's two great books in the context of his exposure to Mao's doctrine of revolutionary warfare in China, the French Army's keen interest in counterinsurgency in the second half of the 1950s, and the transmission of French doctrine to the U.S. military in the early 1960s. It also discusses home-grown American counterinsurgency pioneers like General Edward Lansdale, who promoted Galula's American career and encouraged him to write a book. It details the counterinsurgency fever of President John F. Kennedy's administration, a nearly forgotten episode. Galula died in relative obscurity at the age of 49 in 1967. He had the odd historical luck of not having been a part of the counterinsurgency fever of his day, but of ours instead. Both those who think counterinsurgency has been embraced uncritically and those who think it has not been followed enough will find intellectual ammunition in Galula anfd food for thought in the relationship of his ideas to his time" --

Compares the reasons for and the responses to the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan since October 2001. Also examines the lack of security and the support of insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1970s that explain the rise of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. Explores the border tribal areas between the two countries and how they influence regional stability and U.S. security. Explains the implications of what happened during this 10-year period to provide candid insights on the prospects and risks associated with bringing a durable stability to this area of the world.

A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian—"A remarkable book" (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled "Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army's Conventional Capabilities," that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States' limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author's experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile's views of the failures of COIN, as well as

a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. "Gentile is convinced that Obama's 'surge' in Afghanistan can't work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn't turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it's time to go back to the drawing board." —The New Republic The British 'hearts and minds' approach to counterinsurgency was credited with rare successes against insurgencies in Malaya (1948-60), Northern Ireland (1969-2007) and its widely admired approach to peacekeeping in the nineties. More recently, the British influenced the development of US counterinsurgency thinking on Iraq just as the British Army was perceived to be failing in Southern Iraq. Despite their attempt, the British military failed to restore their reputation by involvement in the 'good war' in Afghanistan. This timely and critical volume questions the effectiveness of Britain's 'hearts and minds' approach and challenges conventional counterinsurgency thinking by drawing on the expertise of regional and thematic specialists. Regional experts suggest that simplistic and over-optimistic lessons drawn from Britain's historical experiences in Malaya and Northern Ireland could not provide lessons for the complexities of Iraq and Afghanistan. Thematic specialists raise questions about the suitability of the military for 'humanitarian interventions' and the impact of these wars on domestic politics and society.

This textbook offers an accessible introduction to counterinsurgency operations, a key aspect of modern warfare. Featuring essays by some of the world's leading experts on unconventional conflict, both scholars and practitioners, the book discusses how modern regular armed forces react, and should react, to irregular warfare. The volume is divided into three main sections: Doctrinal Origins: analysing the intellectual and historical roots of modern Western theory and practice Operational Aspects: examining the specific role of various military services in counterinsurgency, but also special forces, intelligence, and local security forces Challenges: looking at wider issues, such as governance, culture, ethics, civil-military cooperation, information operations, and time. Understanding Counterinsurgency is the first comprehensive textbook on counterinsurgency, and will be essential reading for all students of small wars, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, strategic studies and security studies, both in graduate and undergraduate courses as well as in professional military schools.

The third book in Professor Christian Potholm's war trilogy (which includes Winning at War and War Wisdom), Understanding War provides a most workable bibliography dealing with the vast literature on war and warfare. As such, it provides insights into over 3000 works on this overwhelmingly extensive material. Understanding War is thus the most comprehensive annotated bibliography available today. Moreover, by dividing war material into eighteen overarching themes of analysis and fifty seminal topics, and focusing on these, Understanding War enables the reader to access and understand the broadest possible array of materials across both time and space, beginning with the

earliest forms of warfare and concluding with the contemporary situation. Stimulating and thought-provoking, this volume is essential for an understanding of the breadth and depth of the vast scholarship dealing with war and warfare through human history and across cultures.

Cinematic representations of unconventional warfare have received sporadic attention to date. However, this pattern has now begun to change with the rise of insurgency and counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the growing importance of jihadist terrorism in the wake of 9/11. This ground-breaking study provides a much-needed examination of global unconventional warfare in 20th-century filmmaking, with case studies from the United States, Britain, Ireland, France, Italy and Israel. Paul B. Rich examines Hollywood's treatment of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in the United States; British post-colonial insurgencies in Malaya and Kenya and British special operations in the Second World War; the Irish conflict before and during the Troubles; French filmmaking and the reluctance to deal with the bitter war in Algeria in the 1950s; Italian neorealism and its impact on films dealing with urban insurgency by Roberto Rossellini, Nanni Loy and Gillo Pontecorvo, and Israel and the upsurge of Palestinian terrorism. Whilst only a small number of films on these conflicts have been able to rise above stereotyping insurgents and terrorists - in some cases due to a pattern of screen orientalism - Cinema and Unconventional Warfare in the Twentieth Century stresses the positive political gains to be derived from humanizing terrorists and terrorists movements, especially in the context of modern jihadist terrorism. This is essential reading for academics, postgraduates and advanced undergraduates interested in 20th-century military history, politics and international relations, and film studies.

This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of British military experiences in the post-war era and endeavours to unpack their performance. During the twentieth century counter-insurgency assumed the status of one of the British militaryâe(tm)s fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after the Second World War as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power many opportunities to deploy against an irregular enemy. However, this quantity of experience does not translate into quality. This book argues that the British, far from being exemplars of counter-insurgency, have in fact consistently proved to be slow learners in counter-insurgency warfare. This book presents an analysis of the most significant British counter-insurgency campaigns of the past 60 years: Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Arabia (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish âe~Troublesâe(tm) (1969-79), and the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). Colonial history is used to contextualise the contemporary performance in Iraq and undermine the commonly held confidence in British counter-insurgency. Blending historical research with critical analysis, this book seeks to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse the British approach to counter-

insurgency, as well as considering the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare. It will be of interest to students of counter-insurgency, military history, strategic studies, security studies, and IR in general. During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power. British government officials and military forces proved proficient at defeating or controlling these rebellions. However, these uprisings were much less complex than the modern jihadist insurgency. Past insurgent movements were primarily monolithic or national in form, had very specific local goals, and derived most of their power from the local population. These limitations made past rebellions vulnerable to strong military responses. In contrast, the modern jihadist insurgency is characterized by its complex and global nature. Unlike past insurgent forms that aspired to shape national politics, the jihadist movement espouses larger thematic goals, like overthrowing the global order. The modern jihadist insurgency is also more global in terms of its popular support and operational territory. It makes far better use of communications technology and propaganda to reach the minds and hearts of global audiences. The contemporary international security environment has therefore become a frustrating place for Western powers. Despite great technological and military advances, British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. Operational failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for the West to rethink and retool its current COIN strategy. After analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of the modern jihadist insurgency, the authors suggest a new framework for future COIN operations.
A major contribution to our understanding of contemporary warfare and strategy by one of the world's leading military historians.
Six historic counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Future U.S. COIN operations can learn from these past lessons.
Understanding Land Warfare provides a thorough grounding in the vocabulary, concepts, issues and debates associated with modern land warfare. The book is a thematic, debate-driven analysis of what makes land warfare unique; how it interacts with the other environments; the key concepts that shape how it is executed; the trade-offs associated with its prosecution; and the controversies that continue to surround its focus and development. Understanding Land Warfare contains several key themes: the difficulty of conducting land warfare the interplay between change and continuity the growing importance of co-operation the variety of ways in which land warfare is fought; the competing theoretical debates; the tensions and trade-offs. This book will be essential reading for

military personnel studying on cadet, intermediate and staff courses. In addition, it will also be of use to undergraduate and postgraduate students of military history, war studies and strategic studies.

Duyvesteyn critically examines the potential explanations for the escalation and de-escalation during conflicts involving states and non-state actors, such as terrorists and insurgents.

This book offers a detailed examination of the counter-insurgency operations undertaken by the Nigerian military against Boko Haram between 2011 and 2017. Based on extensive fieldwork conducted with military units in Nigeria, Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria has two main aims. First, it seeks to provide an understanding of the Nigerian military's internal role – a role that today, as a result of internal threats, pivots towards counter-insurgency. The book illustrates how organizational culture, historical experience, institutions, and doctrine, are critical to understanding the Nigerian military and its attitudes and actions against the threat of civil disobedience, today and in the past. The second aim of the book is to examine the Nigerian military campaign against Boko Haram insurgents – specifically, plans and operations between June 2011 and April 2017. Within this second theme, emphasis is placed on the idea of battlefield innovation and the reorganization within the Nigerian military since 2013, as the Nigerian Army and Air Force recalibrated themselves for COIN warfare. A certain mystique has surrounded the technicalities of COIN operations by the Army against Boko Haram, and this book aims to disperse that veil of secrecy. Furthermore, the work's analysis of the air force's role in counter-insurgency is unprecedented within the literature on military warfare in Nigeria. This book will be of great interest to students of military studies, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, African politics and security studies in general.

The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency—a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results. Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization.

Volume 117 of Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Conflict in Afghanistan, includes recent documents relating to the conflict in Afghanistan against the Taliban and its foreign allies. The volume addresses components of the new approach of integrating political and military strategies to improve Western approaches in the region. The first section of the volume includes documents generated by the North American Treaty Organization. These documents focus on the concept of counter-insurgency as a new approach to war-making. The

second section focuses on documents issued by the United Nations: those describing the political side of the military conflict, the human rights situation, and the socio-economic dimension of international efforts. The third section portrays the European Union's role in Afghanistan. The final section includes an overview of recent political and military developments. This collection of documents provides a comprehensive documentary overview of strategies in Afghanistan as of early 2010.

Some of the United States' greatest challenges over the coming decades are likely to emanate from the Asia-Pacific region. China and India are rising and Militant Islam continues to take root in Pakistan, while nuclear proliferation threatens to continue in fits and starts. If America is to meet these challenges comprehensively, strategists will have to learn more about Asia, and Asian scholars, policymakers, and analysts will need to understand better the enduring and timeless principles of strategy. Based on the premise therefore that the increasing strategic weight of the Asia-Pacific region warrants greater attention from both scholars and practitioners alike, Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security aims to marry the fields of strategic studies and Asian studies in order to help academics and practitioners to begin addressing these challenges. The book uses the lenses of geography, culture, and economics to examine in depth the strategic context that Asia presents to the major nations of the region—including the U.S. as a Pacific nation—and the strategic scenarios that may well play out in the region in the near future. Specific attention is paid to Asia as a warfighting environment, and to the warfighting traditions and current postures of the major nations.

This book explores the Kuki uprising against the British Empire during the First World War in Northeast frontier of India (then Assam-Burma frontier). It underlines how of the three-year war (1917–1919), spanning over 6,000 square miles, is crucial to understanding present-day Northeast India. The essays in the volume examine several aspects of the war, which had far-reaching consequences for the indigenous population as well as for British attitudes and policy towards the region – including military strategy and tactics, violence, politics, identity, institutions, gender, culture, and the frontier dimensions of the First World War itself. The volume also looks at how the conflict affected the larger dynamics of the region within Asia, and its relevance in world politics beyond the Great War. Drawing on archival sources, extensive fieldwork and oral histories, the volume will be a significant contribution to comprehending the complex geopolitics of the region. It will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of South and Southeast Asian Studies, area studies, modern history, military and strategic studies, insurgency and counterinsurgency studies, tribal warfare and politics.

This new handbook provides a wide-ranging overview of the current state of academic analysis and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an-up-to date survey of contemporary insurgent movements and counter-insurgencies. In recent years, and more specifically since the insurgency in Iraq from 2003, academic interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency has substantially increased. These topics have become dominant themes on the security agenda, replacing peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and terrorism as key concepts. The aim of this volume is to showcase the rich thinking that is available in the area of insurgency and counterinsurgency studies and act as a further guide for study and research. In order to contain this wide-ranging topic within an accessible and informative framework, the

Editors have divided the text into three key parts: Part I: Theoretical and Analytical Issues Part II: Insurgent Movements Part III: Counterinsurgency Cases The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency will be of great interest to all students of insurgency and small wars, terrorism/counter-terrorism, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general, as well as professional military colleges and policymakers. Tackling one of the most prevalent myths about insurgencies, this book examines and rebuts the popular belief that Mao Zedong created a fundamentally new form of warfare that transformed the nature of modern insurgency. The labeling of an insurgent enemy as using "Maoist Warfare" has been a common phenomenon since Mao's victory over the Guomindang in 1949, from Malaya and Vietnam during the Cold War to Afghanistan and Syria today. Yet, this practice is heavily flawed. This book argues that Mao did not invent a new breed of insurgency, failed to produce a coherent vision of how insurgencies should be fought, and was not influential in his impact upon subsequent insurgencies. Consequently, Mao's writings cannot be used to generate meaningful insights for understanding those insurgencies that came after him. This means that scholars and policymakers should stop using Mao as a tool for understanding insurgencies and as a straw man against whom to target counterinsurgency strategies. Understanding Modern Warfare has established itself as the leading introduction to the issues, ideas, concepts and context necessary to understand the theory and conduct of warfare in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It is an invaluable text for military professionals and students of military history. Key features include: incisive coverage of the debates surrounding contemporary and future warfare; accessible, yet sophisticated, discussion across the land, sea, and air environments; and coverage of contemporary topics such as drones, cyber warfare, and hybrid warfare. The book makes extensive use of text boxes to explain key concepts and to reference extended examples, and it includes annotated guides to further reading and key questions to promote the reader's further thinking. This second edition has been fully revised and updated to take into account new debates and recent events in Syria, Iraq and Ukraine, and it has also been restructured to further improve its usefulness as a teaching tool. Over the last decade (and indeed ever since the Cold War), the rise of insurgents and non-state actors in war, and their readiness to use terror and other irregular methods of fighting, have led commentators to speak of 'new wars'. They have assumed that the 'old wars' were waged solely between states, and were accordingly fought between comparable and 'symmetrical' armed forces. Much of this commentary has lacked context or sophistication. It has been bounded by norms and theories more than the messiness of reality. Fed by the impact of the 9/11 attacks, it has privileged some wars and certain trends over others. Most obviously it has been historically unaware. But it has also failed to consider many of the other dimensions which help us to define what war is - legal, ethical, religious, and social. The Changing Character of War, the fruit of a five-year interdisciplinary programme at Oxford of the same name, draws together all these themes, in order to distinguish between what is really changing about war and what only seems to be changing. Self-evidently, as the product of its own times, the character of each war is always changing. But if war's character is in flux, its underlying nature contains its own internal consistency. Each war is an adversarial business, capable of generating its own dynamic, and therefore of spiralling in directions that are never totally predictable. War is both utilitarian, the tool of policy, and dysfunctional.

This book brings together scholars with world-wide reputations, drawn from a clutch of different disciplines, but united by a common intellectual goal: that of understanding a problem of extraordinary importance for our times. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

This book analyses the issue of child soldiers in order to understand how armed groups engage with international organizations to gain international legitimacy. The work examines why some armed groups 'follow the rules' of international humanitarian law and others do not. It argues that armed groups in conflicts around the world engage with international organizations in order to gain international legitimacy and to show they are following the laws of war. By examining the issue of child soldiers in contemporary armed conflict, the volume establishes a typology of which groups will engage with international actors and follow the laws of war – and which will not. The main aim of the book is to understand the rationality of even the most violent of actors, and to understand when and how armed groups can be encouraged to follow the laws of war. The work draws from extensive primary research conducted among armed groups in Syria and Myanmar, including al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the many small ethnic insurgent groups of Myanmar. This book will be of much interest to students of war and conflict studies, security studies, international humanitarian law, and International Relations.

The British military confronted significant challenges during the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Adhering to the principles and doctrines of previous campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these cities against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing the gap between the ambitions and resources, intent and commitment, that proved so disastrous to the operation. In its detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. It calls attention to the effectiveness of insurgent tactics and the danger of ungoverned spaces shielding hostile groups and underscores the need for the British military to acquire new skills for meeting irregular threats in future wars.

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